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Abstract In this paper we use the components of the PolityIV project’s polity2 and
Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy indicators to analyse the relationship between de jure and
de facto political institutions from 1820 until 2000 with a canonical correlation method
corrected for the sample selection bias. We find considerable fluctuation in the relationship
between the two measures. After a moderate positive correlation found during the first half
of the nineteenth century, the two measures become statistically unrelated until the 1940s.
The relationship becomes strong and positive only in the second half of the twentieth
century. The relationship between de jure and de facto political institutions hence can be
described as a U-curve, reminiscent to an inverse Kuznets-curve.
Keywords Democratization  De facto and de jure institutions  Canonical correlation 
Polity IV  Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy
JEL Classification N40  O17
1 Introduction
The distinction between de jure and de facto institutions is a crucial element in under-
standing how institutions explain observed cross-country differences in socio-economic
outcomes as emphasized in Feld and Voigt (2003), Pande and Udry (2006) and Voigt
(2013). In line with past literature, we define de jure institutions as those comprising of
official, formal rules, while de jure institutions are the ones that are enforced and followed
in practice. Accordingly, de jure institutions are observable as rules, while de facto
institutions are reflected by practices and outcomes. The proper measurement of
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institutions and the distinction between policies and institutions has become the next focal
point in institutional economics as pointed out by Voigt (2013) and Robinson (2013). The
purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we empirically examine if two historical democ-
racy measures that dominate scholarly usage, the polity2 of the PolityIV project (Marshall
et al., 2012) and Index of Democracy (ID) by Vanhanen (2000, 2003) can be used as
proxies of de jure and de facto institutional measures respectively. Using these two
measures, we then investigate whether the relationship between de jure and de facto
political institutions changed over the 1820–2000 period.1 We find that after a period of
moderate positive correlation between the two measures in the first half of the nineteenth
century, they become disconnected until about the 1940s when the link begins recovering,
but a strong positive statistical relationship is present only from the 1970s on.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief conceptual
explanation for the difference between de jure and de facto institution and the related
theoretical literature. In Sect. 3.1 we show why the polity2 and the ID indicators can be
used as proxies of de jure and de facto political institutions. This is followed by the
discussion of methodological and measurement issues in Sect. 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the
observed secular trends where we find that the discrepancy between the two types of
political institutions follows a non-linear U-shaped pattern, reminiscent of an inverse
Kuznets curve. Section 4 summarizes the main findings of the paper.
2 Literature Review
North (1991, p. 97) defines institutions as ‘‘humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interactions’’, which is somewhat restrictive. Hodgson (2006,
p. 2.), suggests a more flexible approach instead by stating that ‘‘we may define institutions
as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions’’. The
role of good institutions is well-established empirically in the literature including legal origin
and religion (La Porta et al. 1999; Shirley 2008), the risk of expropriation and the govern-
ment’s commitment to respect private contracts (Hall and Jones 1999), or more generally, the
rule of law (Hansson 2009). Recently, the focus of research turned toward the distinction
between de jure and de facto institutions and the related measurement issues. As Feld and
Voigt (2003) illustrate in their seminal paper, observed cross-country differences in eco-
nomic growth are better explained by de facto judicial independence than by de jure rules.
Robinson (2013) explicitly calls for the distinction between de facto enforcement and de jure
rules citing the observed contradictions between de jure rules and de facto practices of land
redistribution in the Trobriand-islands. Additionally, the possible effects of other de jure
institutions, such as property rights, on economic performance are conditional on the state of
de facto judicial independences (Voigt and Gutman 2013).
First of all, we adopt a definition for political institutions, since there is no consensus in
the literature on what is meant by political institutions. By political institutions we mean
those formal or informal rules, conventions and norms that govern and constraint the
operation of the government, the operation of political organizations and the distribution of
political power. Hence, political institutions include the rules of the selection of political
1 The number of countries for which both the PolityIV and the Vanhanen dataset have observation increases
over time. In 1820 we have only 21 countries in the sample (Afghanistan, China, Chile, Denmark, France,
Haiti, Japan, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey, the UK and the USA. In 2000, on the other hand, we have 151 observations from all continents.
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executives, the limitations on the government’s power (especially with respect to its cit-
izens) and legislation. De jure political institutions may take various forms such as cus-
toms, laws, and constitutions. Yet, these laws are not necessarily enforced, and uncodified
rules may be in operation in a society. This set of rules, written or unwritten, that are
actually enforced in a society and in practice shape the behaviour of political agents is
labelled as de facto institutions.2 This distinction becomes especially useful when countries
with comparable written political rules experience very different social and economic
outcomes. One obvious example is the political system of the Soviet Union under Stalin.
The Soviet Constitution of 1936, even though assigned a leading role to the communist
party, also declared some fundamental rights to its citizens, including freedom of religion
and universal direct suffrage. Yet, these de jure guarantees did not prevent Stalin from
keeping his absolute power over the state and to run one of the most oppressive police-
states of human history. Obviously, de facto political institutions are more useful in
explaining the history of the Soviet Union than the de jure ones.
As for the existence and possible effects of discrepancies between de facto and de jure
political institutions, both political economy and institutional economics offers theoretical
explanations that predict certain interrelations between de facto and de jure political
institutions and also their relationship with other social, political or economic variables.
We begin with the political economic explanation. The government, as agent, plays a
fundamental role in shaping and enforcing the fundamental rules of interactions, which
takes the form of formal laws and practices. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) make a
distinction of inclusive and extractive political institutions. While the former should reflect
and enforce the interest of the majority, the latter supports extractive economic institutions
that channel resources from the society toward the elite. But the composition of the
political elite is not stationary (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). When another political
group challenges the establishment, the ruling elite will face the choice of either adopting
reforms (changing formal rules) or to resist them at the risk of political instability. The
historical process of regime changes is not automatic, though, and there is an underlying
non-linearity in it: Robinson and Acemoglu (2002) find that regime changes are more
likely to occur at intermediate levels of income inequality. Thereby they link their political
economic model to the empirically observed phenomenon of the Kuzents curve.3 Their
framework of inclusive versus extractive economic and political institutions can be linked
to the concept of de jure and de facto political institution via the instability introduced by
regime-changes. In cases when the elite are forced to make concessions, one should
observe relatively quick changes in the de jure (formal) institutions, but just slow or even
insignificant changes in the de facto institutional framework.4
Another explanation for the discrepancies between the de jure and de facto political
institutions is offered by the institutional economics literature. Boettke et al. (2008) dis-
tinguish foreign-introduced exogenous, indigenously introduced exogenous and indige-
nously introduced endogenous institutions. Exogenous institutions are constructed and
2 The set of de facto and de jure political institutions are hence not disjoint: written rules, when enforced
and respected, both classifies as de jure and de facto institutions. Ideally, in a society where all laws and
regulations are codified and followed, there is no difference between de jure and de facto institutions, hence
it should not matter which one we measure. If there is a detachment between de jure and de facto insti-
tutions, then de facto institutions should, however, necessarily be more associated with observed outcomes.
3 The Kuznets curve (Kuznets 1955) establishes an inverse U-shaped relationship between economic
development and income inequality.
4 In other words, extractive institutions will not be removed easily which introduces a lag in the process of
political transformation.
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forced from above, either by an indigenous group or by a foreign power (colonizer or an
international organization). Endogenous institutions, on the other hand, are the result of
some spontaneous process originating from within the same society. Boettke et al. claim
that these different institution types exhibit different degree of stickiness or ability to resist
changes. Endogenous institutions can efficiently resist external influences for a very long
time, while the foreign-induced ones can be discarded quickly once no external pressure is
present. Hence, we can expect that the difference between de jure and de facto political
institutions has grown with the globalization starting in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, when non-European countries became increasingly subject to the expectations and
directives of Western powers either directly (via colonization) or indirectly (by condi-
tioning aid on political or economic reforms). Historical examples include the failed
attempts by colonial powers to introduce their legislation in Sub-Saharan Africa [Pande
and Udry (2006); Blewet (1995)], or the successful democratization of Germany and Japan
after World War 2.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we focus on the empirical analysis of the components of the polity2 and the
ID indicators. First, in Sect. 3.1 we provide empirical evidence for the central claim of this
paper, namely that the components of polity2 primarily reflect changes in de jure political
institution while the components of ID can better be used as proxies of the de facto
political rules and practices. In Sect. 3.2 we apply the method of canonical correlation to
estimate the strength of the relationship between the components of the two democracy
variables. Finally, Sect. 3.3 provides a brief overview of the secular trends in the rela-
tionship between the components of ID and polity2.
3.1 Measurement Issues: Proxies for de Jure and de Facto Political
Institutions
In this paper, we claim that even though both the Index of Democracy (ID) and the polity2
attempt to capture the same dimensions of democracy, namely competition and partici-
pation in the terminology of Dahl (1972), the former is more successful in measuring
actual outcomes (de facto political institutions) by directly using statistics on voter turnout
and the composition of parliaments, while the five components of polity2 are in fact better
correlated with the formal rules and practices (de jure political institutions).5 We wish to
stress that we do not argue that the two measures were created with the purpose of
measuring de facto or de jure political institutions. What we claim is that due to the
different methodology, they ex-post prove to be better proxies of either the de facto or the
de jure political institutions and that this difference may be useful to gain some insight in
the secular trend of the convergence and divergence between these two aspects of political
institutions.6
5 PolityIV project (Marshall et al. 2012) and Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (Vanhanen 2000, 2003) that
are still the most popular datasets on political institutions stretching over the last two centuries. The Polity
project is constantly updated and currently has data on 167 countries for 1800–2012, while the Index of
Democracy includes 187 countries for 1820–2000.
6 Munck and Verkuilen (2002) already observed a conceptual difference between the two dataset similar to
our argument, namely that the polity indicator is more concerned about the regulatory aspects of
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In this section we use three empirical ways to show that the Polity IV project and the
Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy capture different aspects of political institutions.7 One is
based on the observation of main historical trends, the second is on a test for Granger
causality and the last one is based on the correlation with existing measures of de jure
political institutions.
Firstly, we look at the secular trends in democratization as suggested by the two
measures (Fig. 1). The world averages of the polity2 aggregate suggests that the global
democratization process already began in the mid-nineteenth century, while Vanhanen’s
ID dates the start of the process at the mid-twentieth century. The two aggregate indicators
seem to converge only after the 1950s. Consequently, it is questionable if we can speak of
three global waves of democratization at all, a categorization suggested by Huntington
(1991, 1993), since it is only confirmed by the polity2 but not by the ID. Huntington bases
his classification of democracy based on changes in the de jure political institutions and
considers the political elite’s behaviour as the main driving factor behind the third wave.
This is clearly reflected by the polity2, but not by the ID.
The country-specific trends reveal even more peculiar differences in the underlying
political institutional factors captured by the two indicators. Perhaps the most striking
differences can be observed in the ranking of the USA versus Western European countries
(the UK, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland) but since these are quite similar we
focus on the USA–UK comparison now. Figure 2 reports the relative position of the United
States and the United Kingdom in terms of democracy as reflected by the two measures.
The Polity IV project assigns very high score to the USA during the first half of the
nineteenth century, even though a considerable percentage of the population (Afro-
Americans and the indigenous population) was still disfranchised. After the Civil War, the
USA is constantly set at a maximum score of 10, which is only reached by the UK after
World War 1. The Index of Democracy exhibits a fundamentally different picture: both
countries have a clear trend of increasing democracy but the USA is overtaken by the UK
around 1920 which coincides with the significant extension of political rights that resulted
in more participation and competition. Actually almost all jumps in the UK series can be
identified as an election. The 1837 case, for example, can be identified as the first election
under Queen Victoria’s reign, the last case when the mandate of the Parliaments ended
with the death of the monarch. Similarly the second positive change is in 1880, another
general election, again with a liberal victory and the last positive change is the General
Elections of 1923.
While one possible explanation for the observed trends could be that the polity2 is based
too much on American concepts of democracy which results in USA serving as an etalon
for the whole democratization process, we believe that the explanation lies elsewhere. The
polity2 components are necessarily based on observable changes in the practices and laws
as declared by the political elite. Even if the elite has genuine commitment toward
Footnote 6 continued
participation (if the elections are competitive or not), but does not reflect the actual outcomes in term of
election results.
7 Our choice was primarily motivated by our goal to use comparable data for the longest possible period.
This is the reason why we do not use datasets that are available for shorter periods, such as the Freedom in
the World by Freedom House which is available for only after 1972, the Democracy–Dictatorship data
(Alvarez et al. 1996; Przeworksy et al. 2000) beginning in 1948 and the Democracy Index by the Economist
Intelligence Unit starting from 2006. We also exclude datasets that may have the historical dimension but
are binary and hence do not exhibit enough variation for any meaningful multivariate analysis such as Boix
et al. (2012) or the Democracy–Dictatorship data which also has this feature.
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democratization, polity2 will only reflect changes in de jure institutional framework, i.e.
when there is a change in the written legal sources used for classification. This explains
why we observe sudden jumps in the polity2 reflecting changes in laws, but it is very
unlikely that de facto political institutions (or any other de facto institutions) could ever
undergo changes so fast. Hence the moderate nature of changes in the Index of Democracy
is already an indication that it does not measure the same aspect of democracy as polity2.
The second evidence is based on the analysis of causality, as defined by Granger
(1969).8 Even if changes in the de jure institutions may not always be transplanted with
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Fig. 1 World average scores in different measures of the degree of democracy of political institutions,
1820–2010, Polity2 score of the Polity IV project (-10/?10) and the index of democracy (%). Sources the
































USA(polity2) United Kingdom (polity2)
USA (ID) United Kingdom (ID)
Fig. 2 The polity2 and ID scores for the US and the UK, 1810–2010, Polity2 score of the Polity IV project
(-10/?10) and the index of democracy (%). Sources the polity IV dataset by Marshall et al. (2012) and the
polyarchy data by Vanhanen (2000, 2003)
8 Granger (1969) defines causal link by precedence. If we have reason to assume that the cause happened
before the effect, we can use empirical tests regarding the predictive power of time-series on each other to
draw conclusion regarding the direction of causality. This is a limited, but empirically feasible definition of
causality. Obviously, where expectations play significant role in forming human behaviour, Granger-
causality tests are useless. For example, sending Christmas-cards predates Christmas, but no one would
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some equilibrium between the de jure and de facto institutions (Aoki 2007). For such
equilibrium to exists, however, it is necessary that at least one of the indicators adjusts. The
possibly asymmetric behaviour of the two political indicators can be of use to indirectly
test if our assumption is correct. We use the below dynamic panel specification to test for








ckXi;tkþ gi þ kt þ ui;t ð1Þ
where Y and X denote either the polity2 or the ID depending on the direction of causality
being tested, g and k denote the country and year specific unobserved effects and ui,t is the
random error term. The inclusion of year specific effects is important so that we exclude
the possibility that a third, unobserved factor drives the relationship between polity2 and
ID leading to spurious results. Since the ID can only measure changes in institutions when
elections are allowed, for this test we only use those observations where ID[ 0.
If polity2 indeed represents de jure and ID reflects de facto political institutions, then for
regions where changes in the de jure political institutions are indigenous and are com-
patible with the local institutions (Berkowitz et al. 2003; Boettke et al. 2008), we should
expect that changes in de jure institutions predate changes in the de facto political insti-
tutions. That is, if we are correct, changes in polity2 Granger-cause changes in ID. This is
exactly what we obtain for North-western Europe (reported in the upper rows in Table 1):
Table 1 suggests that in North-western Europe changes in the ID do not predict changes in
the polity2 but they do vice versa.
If changes in de jure political institutions are mostly exogenous, however, just as the
case is in Sub-Saharan Africa, we expect that changes in de jure institutions should not
affect de facto institutions in any significant manner. What we found in the bottom rows of
Table 1 is even more peculiar: while we find that changes in polity indeed do not Granger-
cause changes in the ID, ID seem to have Granger-caused polity in the short-run only. The
total, long-term effect of ID on polity is statistically not significant from zero in Sub-
Saharan Africa. That is, changes in the polity2 in Sub-Saharan Africa only had a short-run,
temporary effect on ID in Sub-Saharan Africa, but no long-run effect can be found at all.
The third evidence is direct. Fedderke et al. (2001) and Gwenhamo et al. (2012) esti-
mated an index of de jure political institutions (political freedom) for South Africa and
Zimbabwe respectively.9 They explicitly take only de jure institutional changes into
account hence their estimates can be used for a cross check. If our claim is correct, then
their political freedom (PF) index should be correlated more strongly with the polity
aggregate than with the ID.
We report the correlation coefficients in Table 2. Because of the presence of a trend or a
possible non-stationarity, we report correlation between first differences. In Table 2 we
find that in South Africa changes in the polity2 measure were positively and statistically
significantly (at 1 %) correlated with changes in de jure political freedom measure by
Fedderke et al. (2001), while the correlation with the ID is significant only at 5 %. The
Footnote 8 continued
believe that those cards actually cause Christmas. In institutional changes, however, this problem is not an
issue.
9 See Fedderke et al (2001) and Gwenhamo et al (2012) for the South Africa and Zimbabwe de jure indices
respectively.
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pattern is somewhat different in Zimbabwe, where we find that, despite the low number of
observations, the polity2 is positively correlated with the Political Freedom by Gwenhamo
et al. (2012) at 5 %, and the correlation coefficients between ID and Political Freedom is
not only statistically insignificant at 10 % but it even turns out to be negative.
Besides conceptual issues, one also needs to cope with some technical problems when
measuring democracy in a multidimensional perspective. The first important issue is the
level of measurement. Most institutional indicators are measured on nominal scale (like the
components of the polity2 score), which can usually be converted to an ordinal scale based
on some theoretical expectations as done by Treier and Jackman (2008, see Table 3).
The polity project addresses this problem by assigning arbitrary numbers (weights) to
different outcomes and sum them up to an aggregate measure labelled as polity2 in Polity
IV (Table 3).10 Numerous studies use this aggregate measure as an explanatory variable
even though, unless the arbitrary weighting accidently coincides with the theoretically
correct one, this practice leads to an omitted variable problem and biased coefficient
estimates.
Another issue is the inclusion of redundant variables as a result of arbitrary aggregation
methods. The polity2 score is the sum of the weighted components, which completely
neglects the commonalities between the components reflected by their correlations (see
Tables 4 and 5).
Adding up these components hence leads to a double counting resulting in an aggregate
component that has more variance than it should have if it were correctly representing the
underlying latent factor of democracy. The same applies to the multiplicative aggregation
adopted by Vanhanen who creates his aggregate Index of Democracy by multiplying
Table 1 Granger causality test
results from Eq. (1)
Sample is limited to cases with
ID[ 0
Dependent variables
Index of democracy Polity
North-western Europe
Lags of index of democracy 0.000 (?) 0.596 (?)
Lags of polity2 0.000 (?) 0.000 (?)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Lags of index of democracy 0.000 (?) 0.003* (-)
Lags of polity2 0.360 (?) 0.000 (?)
Table 2 Linear correlation
coefficients among different
indicators of political institutions
(a) (South Africa, 1936–97), N =







DPolity2 0.497 (0.000) 1
DID 0.257 (0.044) 0.354 (0.005) 1
(b)
DPF 1
DPolity2 0.553 (0.011) 1
DID -0.259 (0.269) -0.048 (0.841) 1
10 Marshall et al. (2013) warns about the possible shortcomings of their aggregation method in their manual.
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observed data on participation (voter turnout) and competition (one minus the share of the
winning party in the parliament). The multiplicative aggregation assures that only countries
with a balanced performance in both aspects will have a high ID score, but there is no
further reason to prefer it above the additive aggregation.
3.2 A canonical Correlation Analysis
In this section we briefly introduce the canonical correlation analysis with a correction for
sample selection bias, which is used to correct for the changing number of observations in
the sample. Canonical correlation analysis is designed to find those linear combinations of
two groups of variables (the components of the polity2 and ID aggregates) that maximize
the correlation among them. If the two groups are not related, the canonical correlation
Table 3 Components of the polity2 index and coding rules




XRCOMP Competitiveness of Executive
Recruitment
Election 3 2 4
Transitional 2 1 3
Selection 1 -2 1
Unregulated 0 0 2
XROPEN Openness of Executive
Recruitment







Closed 1 -1 1
Unregulated 0 0 4
Open (‘‘no election’’) 4 0 3
XCONST Constraint on Chief Executive Parity or subordination 7 4 7
Intermediate 1 6 3 6
Substantial limitation 5 2 5
Intermediate 2 4 1 4
Slight moderation 3 -1 3
Intermediate 3 2 -2 2
Unlimited authority 1 -3 1
PARCOMP Competitiveness of Political
Participation
Competitive 5 3 6
Transitional 4 2 5
Factional 3 1 4
Restricted 2 -1 2
Suppressed 1 -2 1
Not applicable 0 0 3
PARREG Regulation of participation Regulated 5 0 3
Multiple identity 2 0 3
Sectarian 3 -1 2
Restricted 4 -2 1
Unregulated 1 0 3
Source Table 1 in Treier and Jackman (2008, p. 204), and Marshall et al. (2013)
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coefficient should approach zero. When the canonical correlation is different from zero, the
individual weights are indicative of which of the component variables dominate the
relationship. In this way, canonical correlation also deals with the possible redundancy,
since redundant components will have zero weight.
The underlying model can be summarized as a block diagram (Fig. 3).
The canonical correlation analysis hence serves as a test for the underlying assumption
of this paper, namely that the two sets of variables reflect different dimensions of
democracy (de jure and de facto). For periods when we find a high canonical correlation
we can argue that the polity2 and the ID convey the same information. If we find little or no
relationship, however, the two democracy measures cannot be treated as empirical coun-
terparts of the same latent process.
Unfortunately using canonical correlation has its price too. Since the five components of
the polity2 indicator are strongly correlated, we cannot simply create categorical (dummy)
variables from all possible outcomes and use them in the canonical correlation analysis due
Table 4 Spearman rank correlation coefficients between components of the polity2 score in 2000
XRCOMP XROPEN XCONST PARREG PARCOM
XRCOMP 1
XROPEN 0.884 1
XCONST 0.840 0.691 1
PARREG 0.801 0.629 0.808 1
PARCOM 0.790 0.691 0.839 0.784 1
N = 151, we adopted the same ranking as Table 1 in Treier and Jackman (2008)
Table 5 Spearman rank correlation coefficients between components of the polity2 score in 1900
XRCOMP XROPEN XCONST PARREG PARCOM
XRCOMP 1
XROPEN 0.853 1
XCONST 0.533 0.498 1
PARREG 0.560 0.463 0.513 1
PARCOM 0.578 0.575 0.502 0.719 1
N = 51, we adopted the same ranking as Table 1 in Treier and Jackman (2008)




to perfect of near perfect multicollinearity. As an intermediary solution we adopt the
arbitrary weighting scheme by Marshal et all (column 4 of Table 3), but we allow each
component to have their own weight. While an imperfect solution, this still allows a room
for a reweighing of the components and redundant variables will still yield close to zero
coefficients. Also, exceptional events, denoted by codes -66, -77 and –88 (foreign
interruption, interregnum and transition respectively) in the polity dataset are treated as
missing values. We used modern political borders in line with the CLIO-INFRA template;
hence the data on historical states that has no obvious equivalent today are omitted as well.
Finally, since we use long-term historical data we also need to cope with the problem of
sample selection bias, which is usually neglected in the empirical literature. Namely, the
probability that a country is included in the data is not random and is likely to be correlated
with the value of the components included in the analysis. Initially we have observations
on the developed Western nations such as the USA, the United Kingdom and France, while
from the last decades of the nineteenth century we also have data on the periphery to an
increasing extent. Also the number of countries increased steadily in the sample period: in
1820 we have only 21 countries for which both the ID and the polityIV has data and the
number of observations grows to 151 by 2000. Since countries with more efficient insti-
tutions will have a higher chance of being observed (of the 21 countries available in 1820
only 10 are OECD member countries though) than the latecomers the estimated canonical
correlation may theoretically be biased upward.
The selection problem has been described by Heckman (1979) as a form of omitted
variable bias. We follow his two-step procedure for the canonical correlation analysis. In
the first step we estimate the probability if the components of the polity2 and the ID were
observed for a particular year conditioned on the subcontinent it is situated on with a probit
model.11 In the second step we use the two Inverse Mills ratios (on for the ID and another
for the polity2 components) estimated in the first step as additional variables in the
canonical correlation analysis. The novelty of our approach hence lies in the integration of
sample selection correction into the canonical correlation and our historical focus, which
allow for the identification of secular changes in the relationship between the two groups of
democracy components.
3.3 The Long-Term Movement of the Canonical Correlation Coefficients
The results from the canonical correlation analysis on decadal averages are reported in the
‘‘Appendix, in Table 6’’. The coefficients suggest that redundancy is indeed a significant
issue, since usually only one or two components are found to be significant at at least 10 %
level of significance and the rest is usually very close to zero. While our analysis is based on
annual estimates, since the results are basically the same, for convenience we report only the
decadal estimates in the ‘‘Appendix’’. The figures are created from the annual estimates for
the canonical correlation, however. Figure 4 visualizes both types of canonical correlations,
with or without correction for sample selection, and the number of observations.
Figure 5 reveals a slow increase in the first canonical correlation coefficient12 ranging
between 0.508 in 1873 and 0.947 in 1982. Even though these estimates are still biased by
11 The regional division follows the Clio-Infra project’s adopted geographical categorization. The regions
are: Western and Northern Europe, Eastern Europe (including the USSR and later its successors west of the
Ural), Southern Europe, North America, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, Australia and
Oceania, East-, West-, South-, Southeast- and Central-Asia, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
12 We use and report the first (highest) canonical correlation.
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the selection problem, a trend can already be established. Until about the 1860s the
relationship between the two groups of indicators was relatively strong. The relationship
began to weaken until 1873 and slowly increased until World War I again. In the 1930s we





































ﬁrst canonical correlaon with the eﬀect of Inv. Mills rao removed
number of available observaons
Fig. 4 Estimated canonical correlation coefficients per year 1820–2000
Table 6 Canonical correlation between components of polity2 and ID per decade with and without cor-
rection for sample selection bias 1820–1850





































































































































0.780 0.913 0.840 0.875 0.700 0.985 0.709 0.975
N 24 24 34 34 38 38 38 38
t-statistics are reported in parentheses
When inverse Mills ratio is reported, the coefficients are corrected for the selection bias
***,**,* denotes coefficients significant at 10, 5, 1 % level of significance respectively
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World War I and the strong correlation gradually restores finally by the 1960s. Even with a
possibly upward selection bias present we can conclude that until the twentieth century the
relationship between the two set of indicators was medium at most, which confirms the
initial assumption that the two indicators capture different aspects of democratization.
Figure 5 tells us a story which is in accordance with standard knowledge about the
historical democratization process. De jure political institutions and de facto practices
become less connected in periods of fundamental changes or crises such as World War I
and II, the Great Depression, when many oppressive regimes came into power and even
democracies were forced to take extraordinary measures.
Once we correct for sample selection biases, the magnitude of the correlation changes
fundamentally (Fig. 6).
In case of the components of the ID, we even have periods when none of the variables
yield significant coefficients indicating a complete detachment between de jure and de
facto institutions. The corrected canonical correlation coefficients have much larger vari-
ation and they become even negative in the 1930s. Yet, one should bear in mind that the
probability that a country is included in the sample is also result of an estimation and this
introduces additional error. For this reason we apply a Hodrick–Prescot filter (k = 100) on
the obtained corrected first canonical correlation coefficients (Fig. 7) to obtain a better
interpretable trend. Of course this filtering method is based on certain assumptions: we
decided to follow the original paper (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) in choosing the main
parameter as 100, which results in smoother results than the alternative (6.25) suggested by
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Fig. 6 The first canonical correlation coefficient (with correction for sample selection)
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Figure 7 makes the overall picture easier to see: after an initial, moderate, positive
relationship, the corrected canonical correlation coefficients approach zero, meaning that
the two groups of components become linearly independent. This is replaced by an upward
trend only after World War 2, altogether giving rise to relationship reminiscent of a
U-curve. A strong, positive relationship, confirming that the polyarchy dataset by Van-
hanen and the Polity IV data by Marshall et al. measure the same underlying process, is
only found from the 1970s on.
Table 6 offers an explanation on what is responsible for the pattern observed in Figs. 6
and 7. The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratios capturing the effect of sample selection
causes all canonical correlation coefficients to become statistically insignificant from the
1840s until the 1910s and 1920s. Their positive coefficients reflect that basically all
observed linear correlation between the components of polity2 and ID in this period is
caused by the selection bias. The results are indicative that the degree to which formal rules
can translate into outcomes is a time dependent process. Our findings raise doubts
regarding the crucial role of changes in de jure political institutions during the early waves
of democratization. It is also worth noting that the consistency between the two types of
political institutions is a recent phenomenon coinciding with the start of globalization. It is
very likely, hence that this high correlation is due to the enforcing power of international
markets and organizations, which results in a permanent pressure on indigenous political
institutions to adopt foreign-induced, exogenous political institutions.
4 Conclusion
The distinction between de jure and de facto political institutions is of primary importance
to gain a better insight into the long-waves of democratization. In this paper our point of
departure is that the PolityIV and the Index of Democracy measures of democracy should
be treated as empirical proxies of de jure and de facto political institutions respectively. We
showed that the historical trends of democracy and causal relationship reflected by two
measures are so different that the polity2 and the ID aggregates cannot reflect the same
underlying latent democracy factor. Also we found that in the two countries where we have
a data on de jure political institutions (South Africa and Zimbabwe) de polity2 score is
positively and strongly while the ID score is either weakly or even negatively correlated
with the de jure political institutions measure.
We used a canonical correlation analysis with correction for sample selection bias to test
this hypothesis. The novelty of our approach hence lies in the integration of sample selection
correction into the canonical correlation, and in our historical focus. These two allow for the
identification of secular changes in the relationship between the two groups of democracy





1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
ﬁrst canonical correlaon (smoothed by HP ﬁlter)
Fig. 7 Filtered canonical correlation coefficients (HP filter with k = 100)
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the canonical correlation coefficients become insignificant statistically and approach zero. It
is not until the 1940s that the relationship starts to recover in global scale and a strong positive
statistical relationship is achieved only from the 1970s. Our findings suggest the presence of a
U-shaped secular pattern in the relationship between the two democracy measures.
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Appendix: Results from the Canonical Correlation Analysis on Decadal
Averages
See Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.
Table 7 Canonical correlation between components of polity2 and ID per decade with and without cor-
rection for sample selection bias 1860–1890





































































































































0.706 0.977 0.630 0.977 0.593 0.964 0.732 0.964
N 42 42 44 44 45 45 45 45
t-statistics are reported in parentheses
When inverse Mills ratio is reported, the coefficients are corrected for the selection bias
***,**,* denotes coefficients significant at 10, 5, 1 % level of significance respectively
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Table 8 Canonical correlation between components of polity2 and ID per decade with and without cor-
rection for sample selection bias 1900–1930





































































































































0.770 0.965 0.741 0.920 0.876 0.972 0.928 0.980
N 50 50 58 58 62 62 65 65
t-statistics are reported in parentheses
When inverse Mills ratio is reported, the coefficients are corrected for the selection bias
***,**,* denotes coefficients significant at 10, 5, 1 % level of significance respectively
Table 9 Canonical correlation between components of polity2 and ID per decade with and without cor-
rection for sample selection bias 1940–1970




























































































Table 10 Canonical correlation between components of polity2 and ID per decade with and without






































































































0.916 0.962 0.822 0.936 0.821 0.868
N 135 135 158 158 144 139
t-statistics are reported in parentheses
When inverse Mills ratio is reported, the coefficients are corrected for the selection bias
***,**,* denotes coefficients significant at 10, 5, 1 % level of significance respectively
Table 9 continued












































0.886 0.999 0.902 0.986 0.918 0.940 0.958 0.957
N 76 76 84 84 122 122 135 135
t-statistics are reported in parentheses
When inverse Mills ratio is reported, the coefficients are corrected for the selection bias
***,**,* denotes coefficients significant at 10, 5, 1 % level of significance respectively
De Facto Versus de Jure Political Institutions in the… 775
123
References
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008). Persistence of power, elites, and institutions. American Economic
Review, 98(1), 267–293.
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail? The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty.
New York: Crown Business.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the
making of the modern world income distribution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4),
1231–1294.
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., & Przewroski, A. (1996). Classifying political regimes. Studies in
Comparative International Development, 31(2), 3–36.
Aoki, M. (2007). Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes. Journal of Institutional Economics,
3(1), 1–31.
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richard, J. (2003). The transplant effect. The American Journal of Comparative
Law, 51(1), 163–203.
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J., & Leeson, P. T. (2008). Institutional stickiness and the new development
economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67(2), 331–358.
Boix, C., Miller, M., & Rosato, S. (2012). A complete data set of political regimes, 1800–2007. Compar-
ative political studies,. doi:10.1177/0010414012463905.
Dahl, R. A. (1972). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fedderke, J. W., de Kadt, R. H. J., & Luiz, J. M. (2001). Indicators of political liberty, property rights and
political instability in South Africa: 1935–97. International Review of Law and Economics, 21(1),
103–134.
Feld, L. P., & Voigt, S. (2003). Economic growth and judicial independence: Cross country evidence using a
new set of indicators. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 497–527.
Granger, C. W. J. (1969). Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods.
Econometrica, 37(3), 424–438.
Gwenhamo, F., Fedderk, J. W., & de Kadt, R. (2012). Measuring institutions: Indicators of political rights,
property rights and political instability in Zimbabwe. Journal of Peace Research, 49(4), 593–603.
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than
others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83–116.
Hansson, G. (2009). What determines rule of law? An empirical investigation of rival models. Kyklos, 62(3),
371–393.
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1), 153–161.
Hodgson, G. M. (2006). What are institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1), 1–25.
Hodrick, R., & Prescott, E. C. (1997). Postwar US business cycles: An empirical investigation. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 29(1), 1–16.
Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press.
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic Review, 45(1), 1–28.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of
Law Economics and Organization, 15(1), 222–279.
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2013). PolityTM IV project. Political regime characteristics and
transitions, 1800–2012 Dataset users’ manual. Center for Systematic Peace. http://www.
systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf.
Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy. Evaluating Alternative
Indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 5–34.
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–112.
Pande, R., & Udry, C. (2006). Institutions and development: A view from below. In R. Blundell, W. Newey,
& T. Persson (Eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Ravn, M. O., & Uhlig, H. (2002). On adjusting the Hodrick–Prescott filter for the frequency of observations.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), 371–375.
Robinson, J. A. (2013). Measuring institutions in the Trobriand islands: A comment on Voigt’s paper.
Journal of Institutional Economics, 9(1), 27–29.
776 P. Foldvari
123
Robinson, J. A., & Acemoglu, D. (2002). The political economy of the Kuznets curve. Review of Devel-
opment Economics, 6(2), 183–203.
Shirley, M. M. (2008). Institutions and development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Treier, S., & Jackman, S. (2008). Democracy as a latent variable. American Journal of Political Science,
52(1), 201–217.
Vanhanen, T. (2000). A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810–1998. Journal of Peace Research,
37(2), 251–265.
Vanhanen, T. (2003). Democratization: A comparative analysis of 170 countries. London: Routledge.
Voigt, S. (2013). How (not) to measure institutions. Journal of Institutional Economics, 9(1), 1–26.
Voigt, S., & Gutman, J. (2013). Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between
property rights and judicial independence. Journal of Comparative Economics, 41(1), 66–73.
De Facto Versus de Jure Political Institutions in the… 777
123
